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A B S T R A C T   
Air travel during the COVID-19 pandemic is challenging for travellers, airlines, airports, health authorities, and 
governments. We reviewed multiple aspects of COVID peri-pandemic air travel, including data on traveller 
numbers, peri-flight prevention, and testing recommendations and in-flight SARS-CoV-2 transmission, photo- 
epidemiology of mask use, the pausing of air travel to mass gathering events, and quarantine measures and 
their effectiveness. 
Flights are reduced by 43% compared to 2019. Hygiene measures, mask use, and distancing are effective, 
while temperature screening has been shown to be unreliable. Although the risk of in-flight transmission is 
considered to be very low, estimated at one case per 27 million travellers, confirmed in-flight cases have been 
published. Some models exist and predict minimal risk but fail to consider human behavior and airline pro-
cedures variations. Despite aircraft high-efficiency filtering, there is some evidence that passengers within two 
rows of an index case are at higher risk. Air travel to mass gatherings should be avoided. Antigen testing is useful 
but impaired by time lag to results. Widespread application of solutions such as saliva-based, rapid testing or 
even detection with the help of “sniffer dogs” might be the way forward. The “traffic light system” for traveling, 
recently introduced by the Council of the European Union is a first step towards normalization of air travel. 
Quarantine of travellers may delay introduction or re-introduction of the virus, or may delay the peak of 
transmission, but the effect is small and there is limited evidence. New protocols detailing on-arrival, rapid 
testing and tracing are indicated to ensure that restricted movement is pragmatically implemented. Guidelines 
from airlines are non-transparent. Most airlines disinfect their flights and enforce wearing masks and social 
distancing to a certain degree. A layered approach of non-pharmaceutical interventions, screening and testing 
procedures, implementation and adherence to distancing, hygiene measures and mask use at airports, in-flight 
and throughout the entire journey together with pragmatic post-flight testing and tracing are all effective 
measures that can be implemented. 
Ongoing research and systematic review are indicated to provide evidence on the utility of preventive mea-
sures and to help answer the question “is it safe to fly?“.  
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1. Introduction 
COVID-19 has changed traveller numbers, destinations and flight 
patterns and the situation remains in constant flux. Travellers must 
comply with protective measures as considered appropriate by the 
country of departure, the country of arrival and the transporter, in 
particular airlines. There is confusion with regard to the risk of trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2. On one hand there is the risk of infection in- 
flight or at airports, which airlines address with measures such as the 
use of filters, monitoring and testing of passengers. On the other hand, 
governments try to limit the risk of transporting infectious passengers 
from abroad or within a country with measures such as travel bans and 
quarantines. 
Despite large numbers of studies, there is still only scant evidence 
evaluating protective measures for air travel or indeed for everyday life. 
How useful are masks, hand sanitisers, thermo screening, pre-flight 
testing, seat distancing and air filtration systems respectively? Which 
measures are scientifically proven to have a benefit, and which are 
merely there to show that an effort is being made? There is a lack of 
unanimity throughout the world with respect to the definition of risk 
areas and thresholds for restricted travel as well as to the necessity, 
effectiveness, duration and implementation of quarantine measures. 
Airlines are struggling to be compliant with COVID-19 prevention 
guidelines while somehow retaining at least partial flight services. 
Travellers are struggling with the decision “Should I stay, or should I 
go?“. This narrative review aims to assess the status quo of air travel 
measures in the context of COVID-19 as of October 2020 and to examine 
their scientific basis if appropriate. 
2. Methods 
As a group, we divided up topics related to air-travel in the pandemic 
period and did a rapid narrative review on each of the assigned sub- 
topics. For identification of relevant publications, a standardized 
search strategy was used. The PubMed, Scopus and Web of Sciences 
databases were searched by using the search terms “In-flight”, “flight”, 
“transmission”; “SARS-CoV-2′′, “airborne”, “respiratory”, “aviation”, 
“COVID”, “COVID-19”, “Corona”, “aircraft” in various combinations 
with the terms “cabin”, “transmission”, “social distancing”, “quarantine” 
and testing”. Additionally, cited publications in the original hits were 
screened and included if relevant, with no restrictions on language and 
years. IATA, flightradar24 and Forwardkeys were sources of information 
on air transport volumes. We checked official websites, did an airline 
survey by email or contacted airlines via social media to evaluate pre- 
flight and in-flight measures/precautions/recommendations adapted 
by airlines. 
3. Results 
3.1. Travel numbers 
Air travel numbers have significantly declined. The International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) reported worldwide passenger departures 
totalling 4.5 billion on 39 million scheduled flights in 2019 (117 per 
flight on average). Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPKs) flown were 8.7 
trillion in 2019 (with 1911 km per departure on average). 
For 2020 IATA foresees a substantial reduction in numbers, with 
passenger departures projected at 2.2 billion (−51.6%), flights at 23 
million (−40.6%) and RPKs at 3.9 trillion (−54.7%) (with 1749 km per 
passenger on average) [1], [Table 1]. Data refers to international flights 
(between countries and territories) as well as domestic flights (within 
countries and territories). Based on mode of transport, 58% of interna-
tional overnight visitors reached their destination by air in 2018 ac-
cording to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) [2]. As for 
international travel, the vast majority of flights are within the same 
world region, rather than flights between regions. 
Domestic air travel is rather concentrated in the large populous 
countries such as the US, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian 
Federation and Brazil. 
Commercial flights (including cargo, but excluding private flights, 
some business jet flights, most helicopter, ambulance, military and 
drone flights) are tracked flights in virtual real-time by Flightradar24 
and offer insight in flight evolution over time. The year 2020 started 
with growth in January in commercial flights. In February there was a 
moderate decrease because of the disruption of traffic within and to/ 
from China. With the lockdowns increasingly being installed in many 
countries, flights were 55% down in the final week of March 2020 
compared to the same period of 2019 [3]. In April 2020, flights were 
74% below the same month in 2019, but showed early signs of a turning 
point at the very end of the month [4]. This slow recovery continued 
with flights down 71% in May [5], 62% in June [6], 50% in July [7], 
45% in August [8], 43% in September and 42% in October 2020 [9]. At 
the height of the pandemic, a majority of countries closed borders for 
inbound and/or outbound travel with traffic limited to repatriation of 
travellers and essential travel, or sometimes for all travel. In some cases, 
mandatory quarantine was ordered. Rising numbers at the end of August 
and throughout September have seen European countries adapt rec-
ommendations and restrictions with changes being implemented at 
short notice. At the start of October, at the time of writing, a second 
wave of COVID-19 is moving through Europe necessitating multiple 
travel restrictions. 
Domestic travel has been overall less restricted. The travel analytics 
company, Forwardkeys, based on its latest analysis, expects domestic air 
travel in China to have fully recovered by the start of September 2020. 
This is highly significant, because it is the first time, since the start of the 
COVID-19 outbreak, that a major segment of the aviation market, any-
where in the world, has returned to pre-pandemic levels [10]. 
The most resilient travel flows and the projected quickest to recover 
include the following [10]:  
• Nearby destinations, domestic or neighboring countries  
• Late bookings and private transport  
• Visiting family, friends and relatives (VFR)  
• Essential business travel, such as visiting clients, and providers. 
Meetings on the other hand are predicted to be held virtually when at 
all possible. 
3.2. Quarantine measures and travel bans 
COVID-19 has changed how we travel; travel advisories and travel 
bans as well as quarantine or self-isolation when entering a country are 
now commonplace. For the international traveller, the variable and 
Table 1 
IATA, worldwide airline industry.   
unit 2019 2020 % 
change  real projection 
Aircraft fleet  29,697 20,261 −31.8 
Scheduled flights million 38.9 23.1 −40.6 
- flights per aircraft  598 355 −40.6 
Passenger departures* billion 4.5 2.2 −50.6 
- passengers per flight  117 97 −16.7 




8680 3929 −54.7 
- average distance per passenger km 1911 1749 −8.4 
Unique city pairs  21,187 16,102 −24.0 
Passenger load factor % 82.5 62.7 −19.8 
Source: compiled from International Air Transport Association (IATA) Airline 
Industry Economic Performance - June 2020 – Report & Data tables https:// 
www.iata.org/en/publications/economics/?Search=&EconomicsL1=149&Eco 
nomicsL2=150 * Departures refer to legs flown, so # of round trips is half for 
direct flights, and a third or less for indirect flights. 
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broad border measures now mean that they not only need to consider 
disease risk, but also need to take into account the need for quarantine at 
their destination, on their return, or both. Travel restrictions and quar-
antine are often the first response against emerging infectious disease 
threats [11]. They are used as public health tools to combat the inter-
national spread of COVID-19, although their utility is yet to be deter-
mined. The rationale for the implementation of quarantine is complex, 
based on a combination of factors such as economy, political agenda, 
and changing knowledge and epidemiology. Differing national and in-
ternational guidance, evolving evidence, and the potential for recom-
mendations to change rapidly make travel a lot more complex [Table 2]. 
3.3. Travel advisories and bans 
International travel advisories have been introduced, but where is 
the evidence that such bans are effective? While the direct effect of such 
advisories is difficult to quantify, travel advisories during the SARS 
epidemic in 2003 did result in a significant reduction in travel, but these 
were considered to be too late and too small to influence the global 
spread of SARS had there not been such effective control of the epi-
demics within affected areas [12]. 
Similarly, travel bans have been introduced in response to other 
emerging infectious disease threats, but the evidence relating to their 
impact has been inconsistent [13]. An analysis of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic showed that the decline in air travel to and from Mexico was 
too small to have an impact, and stricter restrictions would have led to 
delays of about two weeks even with early intervention [14]. Border 
closure were, however, shown to be effective in controlling the 1918–19 
influenza pandemic in various Pacific islands [15], and theoretically 
might be helpful in small island nations with low traveller numbers [16], 
but a systematic review of the effectiveness of travel restrictions in 
containing the spread of influenza showed that in general, travel re-
strictions had only limited effect, and the degree of impact was depen-
dant on multiple factors ranging from the extent and timing of the 
restrictions, the epidemic size, to virus transmissibility and travel 
patterns. 
The review concluded that only extensive travel restrictions had any 
meaningful effect on reducing the magnitude of epidemics, and on their 
own, might delay the spread and peak of pandemics by a few weeks or 
months but the evidence for containment of influenza within a defined 
geographical area was lacking [17]. 
In the case of COVID-19, the evidence reveals a similar picture; some 
research has indicated a negligible effect of travel bans [18], and other 
studies have suggested a delay in disease spread and case numbers, 
albeit with a recognition that complete travel bans are unlikely to be 
sustainable in the longer term [19,20]. Yet, the current situation and 
patchwork of bans and quarantine measures is unprecedented in scale. 
3.4. Quarantine recommendations, their usefulness and risks 
Quarantine (the restriction of asymptomatic healthy people who 
may have had exposure to an infectious disease) after travel is one of the 
oldest, public health tools known. Adopted widely in the fourteenth 
century to stop the spread of plague, quarantine has subsequently been 
used with varying degrees of success following international travel. 
Following the 2003 SARS outbreak, an assortment of quarantine 
approaches was used in five severely affected countries/regions. While 
measures were highly effective in reducing onward transmission of 
SARS by containment of imported cases on arrival, implementation of 
quarantine was resource intensive, involved coordination of multiple 
sectors of society, frequently required new legislative actions or au-
thorities, and was highly dependent on effective communication [21, 
22]. 
In the context of COVID-19, a Cochrane review found that quarantine 
is important in reducing incidence and mortality, and early imple-
mentation combined with other public health measures is important to 
ensure effectiveness. They also concluded that the quarantine of trav-
ellers from a country with a declared outbreak may delay its introduc-
tion or re-introduction, or may delay the peak of transmission, or both, 
but the effect was small, and their confidence in the results was low or 
very low due to the limitations in the evidence available [23]. 
As of 3rd September, an estimated 156 countries or territories have 
introduced some form of traveller quarantine measures [24], and in the 
absence of any international consensus this means that approaches to 
quarantine and how it is implemented (voluntary/mandated, home/-
government facility, individual/group etc) will vary from country to 
country; likely based on a combination of factors, including epidemi-
ology, culture, local context, economic imperatives and political factors. 
However, any decision to introduce quarantine measures is not without 
risk, requires adequate resourcing, and needs to account for the poten-
tial negative effects, which are increasingly being reported [25]. 
As of October 9th, the Council of the European Union introduced a 
“traffic light system” based on infection rate per 100′000 people. The 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) will publish 
a map weekly categorizing EU regions into different zones for which 
different rules will apply. This is being complicated by countries being 
able to additionally set their own rules. A common testing regime has 
still not been set out making the framework difficult to work and further 
adding uncertainty to travel as nations are only required to provide 
information on new restrictions 24 h before enforcement [26]. 
3.5. Pre-flight passenger screening 
COVID-19 has led to unprecedented lockdowns and reduction of air 
travel globally, fuelled by fear of trans-border introduction of the virus 
and onboard transmissions. The fear is not ungrounded as past instances 
with SARS-COV have shown that superspreader events can lead to 
hundreds of new infections. Transmission mainly occurs in the symp-
tomatic phase of the illness [27,28]. However, many infections in 
SARS-CoV-2 are also associated with contact to asymptomatic or pre-
symptomatic patients [29,30]. 
In essence, flying will be safer and superspreading events diminished 
by optimizing screening procedures, minimizing the risk of allowing 
pre- or asymptomatic patients to board, and consequent implementation 
and adherence to simple hygiene measures that prevent the spread of 
diseases. 
Various strategies have been introduced to detect SARS-CoV-2 car-
riers including temperature screening, which is currently advised by 
IATA [31]. A recent paper has shown the lack of utility of temperature 
screening in the identification of young infected persons. Another option 
is demanding negative PCR tests before letting passengers board, a 
Table 2 
Some Factors that may be considered when making quarantine decisions.  
1.Disease specific factors 
Incubation period, reproduction number, extent of asymptomatic and pre- 
symptomatic transmission, severity of illness, population level immunity 
Knowledge of key characteristics of infection 
Availability of vaccine or effective treatment 
2.Epidemiology 
Worldwide epidemiology 
Rates of infection in receiving country 
3.Travel patterns 
4. Healthcare factors 
Effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical control measures 
Resilience during a crisis 
Availability of prompt and efficient testing and contact tracing 
Capacity of healthcare systems 
5.Legal and ethical considerations, likelihood of compliance 
6.Economic and logistic factors  
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strategy Swiss Airlines is partly pursuing by allowing mask free travel 
with a medical certificate and a negative PCR test [32]. Certain desti-
nation countries also require a negative PCR test at point of entry [33]. 
Simple measures, such as allowing only passengers to enter airports, 
regular disinfection of surfaces, and mandatory PPE for staff and 
handing out packs containing disinfectants and masks, have been 
introduced at various airports around the world [34]. 
3.6. Temperature screening 
Temperature screenings have been introduced worldwide in an effort 
to reduce transmissions. The installation of thermoscanners can be quite 
costly. During the SARS pandemic, Canada spent around 5.7 million 
dollars on the installation of such scanners, yet failed to detect a single 
case [35,36]. Initial data speculated that only around 45% of travelers 
would be detected by temperature screenings [37], recent data suggests 
that number is much lower, as amongst young people a vast majority 
never develops fever [38], suggesting that fever measurements are not 
an adequate screening method for airports. 
3.7. COVID-19 tests 
There are three main ways to establish infection with SARS-CoV-2; 
nucleic acid tests to detect the presence of RNA, either via RT-PCR or 
LAMP. Antigen testing for the presence of a viral antigen, usually a 
surface protein. Antibody tests to detect prior infection using ELISA or 
LFA assays. 
For diagnostic testing the gold standard currently is naso-/oropha-
ryngeal swabbing with subsequent RT-qPCR analysis. The sensitivity 
varies greatly based on who performs the test and how it is being per-
formed (only NP, OP + NP, only OP) in addition to viral RNA concen-
trations varying across the respiratory tract. A previous study in which 
both OP and NP specimen were collected in previously SARS-CoV-2 
positively confirmed patients showed discordant results in 38% of the 
cases [39]. Due to the invasive nature of the test, prolonged positivity 
post recovery and variability of the results based on who performs them 
this makes it a poor tool for screening. 
The immune response against SARS-CoV-2 does not reflect infec-
tivity of the individual, especially since in most cases the immediate IgM 
response is absent or not measurable [40]., In addition commercial 
ELISA kits are costly and LFA assays lack the required sensitivity making 
them poor candidates for screening purposes. 
The most promising candidates are thus antigen based testing and 
saliva tests. 
Saliva tests have a similar sensitivity to PCR tests of 91% [41], and 
most importantly are non-invasive and can be considered for 
self-testing. Colorimetric tests such as New England Biolabs tests seem 
especially promising as they allow testing with minimal amounts of 
equipment and results can be obtained within half an hour. Antigen tests 
such as Abbotts Rapid test are another option, as they provide imme-
diate results and have a very high specificity. However, they still rely on 
nasopharyngeal swabbing [42] and have faced scrutiny in the past over 
low sensitivity of their tests [43]. 
Recently, Finland and other countries are training dogs to detect 
SARS-CoV-2 positive patients. In a pilot study by Jendrny et al. 
tracheobronchial secretions and saliva were collected from positive 
hospitalized patients. The study was double blinded (dog, handler and 
observer) and the dogs were able to find positive samples with a sensi-
tivity of 82% and specificity of 96.5% - most notably there was no sig-
nificant difference between saliva and tracheal secretions (85% vs 87% 
hitrates). While the specificity of rapid COVID-19 Antigen tests is higher 
(99.5%), the sensitivity of dogs is much superior to those of antigen 
based tests (56.2%) [44,45]. A limitation of the study is that only 
samples from hospitalized patients were used. A follow up study with 
samples from different time points of a patient is needed since especially 
pre-/asymptomatic patients’ samples are of interest. Nonetheless certain 
airports, such as the one in Helsinki [46] have already started using dogs 
to detect SARS-CoV-2 in travelers with satisfying results and a “sensi-
tivity of almost 100%“. 
As of October 10th, more than 90 countries require arriving air 
passengers to be in possession of a negative COVID-19 PCR result from a 
test taken within a prescribed number of days prior to arriving in the 
respective country. The usefulness of this measure needs evaluation. 
More than 30 additional countries require a negative COVID-19 PCR test 
result to be exempt from quarantine or other restrictions. Although 
antigen testing may be more readily available, only PCR test results are 
accepted by these countries. More than 60 countries require COVID-19 
testing upon arrival in the respective country, some regardless of 
whether the traveller already had a negative COVID-19 test result prior 
to arrival [47]. 
3.8. Physical distancing on planes, use of masks, hand sanitisation and 
air filtration systems 
In recent time, transmission of COVID-19 during airplane travel has 
gained enormous importance for re-establishing worldwide travel ac-
tivities. Since air travellers spend extended periods in enclosed spaces 
where physical distancing is difficult or impossible, there is a theoretical 
risk of spread of infectious diseases during the flight. Although there is 
sparse knowledge on COVID-19, recent evidence is available for other 
(SARS-like) viruses and their dissemination during airplane travel. 
However, comparisons are difficult to make since the kinetics of viruses 
are different due to their size, aerosol-linked movement in the aircraft 
cabin as well as their infectivity. Recent studies in previous years have 
focused on other infectious diseases such as the Zika virus [48], yellow 
fever [49], the influenza virus [50,51], Ebola [52], SARS [27,53], and 
others [54] but differences with COVID-19 precludes firm conclusions. 
3.9. Aircraft cabin 
The cabin of a typical aircrafts [Fig. 1] is usually provided with a 
high airflow of many cubic meters per minute, which replaces the air 
onboard the cabin every two to 3 minutes. Air filtration in various 
implementations has become a critical intervention in managing the 
spread of COVID-19. Recent evidence has shown that severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS-CoV-2) can remain airborne longer and travel 
farther than anticipated earlier in the COVID-19 pandemic, and high- 
efficiency particulate Air/Arrestance (HEPA) filters have been recom-
mended [55]. In a typical aircraft, the recirculated air is passed through 
HEPA filters, which are required to remove over 99.97% of particles 
Fig. 1. Sample airflow, A320.  
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characterized by aero-diameter of 0.3 μm or larger [56]. In practice, 
however, they were found just as efficient at 0.01 μm, which is much 
smaller than the 0.125 μm size of the virus that causes COVID-19 [56, 
57]. Altogether, high airflow and use of HEPA filters onboard planes 
make it unlikely to catch the virus from someone who is not in the im-
mediate vicinity. 
3.10. Social distancing, hygienic procedures and inflight transmission 
Social distancing during the whole time at an airport as well as 
during boarding, sitting and de-boarding of the aircraft is of utmost 
importance to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Whereas the in-flight 
transmission of symptomatic COVID-19 patients is comparatively easy 
to identify due to clinical symptoms and is an established screening 
procedure [58,59], the evidence for the transmission of the virus from 
asymptomatic passengers on an aircraft is inconclusive. Only sparse data 
are available yet [60]. 
In-flight transmission has been long-standing described for multiple 
infectious agents, especially bacterial and viral respiratory pathogens 
[61], such as tuberculosis [62–64], influenza [65,66], measles [67], and 
coronaviruses, such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome corona-
virus (SARS-CoV) [27,61,68–72]. 
During a flight from Singapore to Hangzhou International Airport in 
Zhejiang, China, in January 2020, a commercial aircraft carrying 335 
passengers and crew members, 16 patients, not using face masks, were 
exposed and infected with SARS-CoV-2. The median age of those 
infected was 37 years, and no fatal outcomes were reported in these 
series, although 10 of these cases were symptomatic [73]. 
Two more instances of inflight transmissions were reported. One 
during a domestic flight between Sydney and Perth with 11 infectious 
cases during the flight. 6 were seated mid cabin and 5 aft cabin. They 
noticed a significantly greater risk of transmission in secondary in-
fections in mid cabin vs aft cabin seats (11/112 vs 0/101 passengers) as 
well as window seats 7/28 vs non-window seats (4/83) [74]. 
The second flight was a long haul flight between London Heathrow, 
and Hanoi during which one primary case seated in business class led to 
15 secondary infections. 12/15 passengers were seated in business class, 
3/15 in economy class. The authors concluded that seating proximity 
(<2 seats away) was associated with the highest risk of transmission 
[75]. 
Preliminary data from the U.S. Department of Defense using Boeing 
777–200 and 767–300 air frames was released to shed light on aerosol 
behavior and virus reduction during a flight using mannequins. The 
study showed a minimum 99.7% reduction of virus aerosols. The au-
thors concluded that the infection risk is thus 1 infection per 54 h of 
flight and zero infections during a 12-h flight. This contrasts the cases we 
described in this article in which several instances of inflight trans-
missions are reported. While the risk of transmission is probably low, 
such models are based on sitting mannequins and do not take into ac-
count human interactions, differences in airflow throughout the flight, 
possible infections during boarding or deboarding or even differences in 
seating arrangements during which infection risk also seems to differ. 
Further studies are necessary to evaluate elements in human behavior 
and heightened infection risk, as well as particularities and differences 
in airline safety protocols which could account for the differences in 
infection observed between flights [Table 3]. 
As a consequence of the risk, the recommendation of face masks on 
board has been extended internationally during this period of transition 
from the pandemic to the peri-pandemic era. In a study of the repa-
triation of Israeli citizens from Japan, who had been passengers on the 
Diamond Princess cruise ship, no case of in-flight transmission of SARS- 
CoV-2 in the 14-h flight was shown, likely due to use of face masks on 
board [76]. 
The risk of transmission of droplet-mediated infections on an aircraft 
depends on proximity to an index case and on other factors, such as 
movement of passengers and crew, fomites, and contact among pas-
sengers in the departure gate [68,77]. 
Considering the difficulty of airborne infection transmission in-flight 
because of HEPA filters used in aircraft ventilation systems, contact with 
contaminated surfaces or infected persons when boarding, moving, or 
disembarking from the aircraft may play a critical role in inflight 
transmission of infectious diseases [27,61]. Whilst seated, Hoehl et al. 
characterized high risk only passengers seated within two rows of an 
index case [68]. 
Real-world data bodes well for flying too. Worldwide, there have 
been a few reports of individual transmissions linked to flights, but no 
superspreading-type events. Australia, through its exhaustive contact 
tracing system, did not identify any case of on-board transmission, even 
for people who travelled whilst contagious [78]. Bae and colleagues 
analysed 310 passengers who boarded an evacuation flight from Milan, 
Italy, to South Korea. N95 respirators were provided, and passengers 
were kept 2 m apart for physical/social distancing before boarding. 
After an 11-h flight, 299 asymptomatic passengers arrived in South 
Korea and were immediately quarantined for 2 weeks [79]. Only one 
passenger became infected after the flight [79]. 
Barnett estimated the risk of catching the virus during a full 2-h flight 
to be around 1 in 4300. The risk drops to 1 in 7700 if airlines leave the 
middle seat empty [80]. This is further confirmed by recent data sug-
gesting that following strict measures with the risk of infection with 
SARS-CoV-2 on flights remains extremely low (44 transmissions in 1.2 
billion travellers). Even when taking underreporting into account, those 
figures are very promising. 
Table 3 
Published cases of inflight transmission of COVID-19 with known index cases.  
Scientifically confirmed cases of 





From - > To Date Flight 
length 
Article Comment 




4 h 10 
min 
Speake et al. 
[74]  




12 h Khanh et al. 
[75]  




10 h Schwartz et al. 
[94]  




10 h Hwan be et al. 
[79] 
Was wearing mask, 
transmission most likely in 
toilet 




4 h 40 
min 
Hoehl et al. 
[68]  




2 h Pavli et al. 
[95]  




10 h Zhang et al. 
[96]  




7 h Eldin et al. 
[97]   
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The International Air Transport Association (IATA) supported 
wearing of face coverings for passengers and crew while on board 
aircraft, but did not support mandating social distancing measures that 
would leave ‘middle seats’ empty, based mainly on an economical 
argument. Airlines for Europe (A4E) stated that „leaving middle seats 
free (…) is not viable for the air transport industry given it would reduce 
the maximum number of passengers onboard to between 50 and 66% of 
aircraft capacity. Due to high operating and other fixed costs, airlines 
require planes to be at least 77% full in order to “break even.“ 
The odds of dying of a case contracted in flight are estimated at 
between 1 in 400,000 to 1 in 600,000 depending on age and risk factors, 
which is comparable to the risk for a standard 2-hour exposure on the 
ground [80]. Finally, the risk of infection is also increased during travel 
to and from the airport, as public transportation and ridesharing can 
increase the risk of getting exposed to the virus [81]. 
3.11. Mass gatherings 
Mass gatherings (MGs) are watched cautiously by public health ex-
perts because of its three important public health implications [82]. 
First, MG related adverse health events and medical emergencies can 
compromise the public health response capacity of the host country. 
Second, MGs can accelerate disease outbreaks to epidemic levels in the 
host country. Third, MG related travel can accelerate the global seeding 
of pathogens with epidemic potential and may cause silent or explosive 
outbreaks globally. Air travel is particularly implied as a risk factor for 
the 2nd and 3rd outcome, and most notably for the 3rd. 
Increasing access to air travel is the most critical enabler of inter-
national mass gatherings such as the Hajj and the Olympics Games. 
However, air travel is also becoming increasingly relevant for other 
mostly domestic or regional MGs such as the Khumb Mela in India, 
Arbaeen in Iraq, and the Shiite pilgrimage to Qom in Iran. About three 
quarters of Olympics participants and Hajj pilgrims use air travel to 
reach their MG destination [82,83]. It was in light of this fact that 
following the World Health Organization declaration of a public health 
emergency of international significance (PHEIC) on COVID-19, the au-
thors advocated for the suspension of the of the year-around Umrah 
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, the trend setter for future MG cancellations 
[82]. Subsequent declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic strengthened 
the call for the cancellation of MGs. MGs including the annual interna-
tional Hajj pilgrimage, the Olympics Games 2020 in Japan, the Miami 
Beach Arts Fair, California’s spring Coachella Valley Music and Arts 
Festival, and Canada’s national music awards (the Junos) have been 
cancelled or postponed. 
Due to airborne routes of disease transmission, respiratory diseases 
are the most common and consistent public health risk during mass 
gatherings [83]. When transmission occurs from innate surfaces and 
from human secretions, high density occupation in common spaces, high 
density crowding in event venues, and high frequency use of shared 
toilet facilities add to the complexity of transmission for both air travel 
and mass gatherings. 
There is no known short-cut to hosting a true mass gathering amid a 
respiratory disease pandemic of high transmission potential, mortality, 
and poorly understood natural history such as COVID-19. During such 
uncertainties, the overwhelming public health recommendation have 
been to cancel the event [84,85]. 
Communities that held MG events prior to COVID-19 PHEIC such as 
the Qom pilgrimage in Iran and a conference in Boston have resulted in 
extensive COVID-19 transmission [86,87]. 
Cases also increased to epidemic levels in areas that hosted multiple 
events as in the State of South Dakota in the USA. The scaled down Hajj 
2020 [88] with 1000 domestic pilgrims in Mecca (1200 square kms) do 
not meet the definition of a mass gathering (an event that strains the 
planning and response resources of the health system in the community 
where it takes place) as the downsizing afforded nearly 27 square meters 
of personal space to each pilgrim in the most potentially crowded 
pilgrim ritual area, the Grand Mosque. 
As mitigation fatigue increases among the population, providers of 
travel health services will be faced with interest from their patients 
about participation in fly-in mass gatherings. 
Attendance in religious MGs are highly sensitive events to many 
people and lifelong wishes of many, and interest in religious MGs may be 
amplified at times of uncertainty such as a pandemic. 
However, in the absence of a vaccine or specific pharmaceutical 
intervention, participation in mass gathering during an active pandemic 
(with a respiratory virus that sustains among asymptomatic carriers) 
may not be encouraged. By providing a full list of implications of 
participation in MGs during respiratory disease pandemics (such as lock 
down for an extended period of time if exposed, challenges with medical 
evacuations if ill, the cost of evacuation for a pandemic disease acquired 
at a mass gathering), providers of travel health services can play an 
important role to help their patients to make informed decisions about 
MG attendance. 
3.12. Measuring mitigation compliance: photo-epidemiology to measure 
face covering use 
The success of modified air-travel amid a pandemic requires review 
of traveller compliance with prevention interventions, and ultimately of 
the utility of such interventions in reducing air-travel related risk of 
transmission. Participation compliance in individualized surveys or as-
sessments is likely to be suboptimal in travel settings due to privacy 
issues, time factors, and crowded settings. One innovative epidemiologic 
surveillance approach has been the use of photo-epidemiology methods 
were systematically obtained sequential photographs of the crowd and 
analysed manually or using face recognition systems. Photo- 
epidemiology has its origins in wildlife surveillance, but Elachola & 
Ebrahim studied its utility to monitor face mask use for prevention of 
respiratory viruses and umbrella use for sun protection during the 2009 
and 2013 Hajj mass gathering [89,90]. Those reports remain as the first 
ever reported estimates of face mask and umbrella use during mass 
gatherings. Elachola and Ebrahim applied this method at airports for the 
first time early during the COVID-19 outbreak and reported face mask 
use among travellers observed at airports in Asia, Europe and USA [91]. 
At the height of COVID -19 lockdowns photo-epidemiology methods 
were also applied to monitor population face covering use in most fre-
quented venues such as supermarkets [92]. The findings from these two 
studies generally corresponded to the disparities observed in imple-
mentation of face covering advisories, historic population exposure to 
face covering advisories. 
The above experiences underscore the utility of photo-epidemiology 
to monitor face covering use among travellers. Photo-epidemiology 
studies can be tailored to specific flights as it can be conducted at de-
parture lounges, arrival gates, and inside the cabin. Thus, photos taken 
at multiple points of a flight can also ascertain pre-boarding and post 
embarkation variation in face covering use, all of which affect airborne 
transmission of SARS-COV-2. While photo-epidemiology helps to 
address self-report bias of individualized surveys, this method may not 
be suitable for stratified analysis by age, gender and other characteristics 
of the surveyed population. Yet, photo-epidemiology remains the only 
available tool to measure population level prevalence of compliance of 
face coverings. 
3.13. Preparedness for compounding transmission risk and uncertainties 
to air travellers due to emergencies during pandemic 
The crash of the Air India COVID-19 related repatriation flight car-
rying Indian emigrant workers from Dubai to Kozhikode airport on 
August 7, 2020 underscores how disease transmission risk from air 
travel could be compounded during pandemics. The 199 persons on 
board this flight had pre-flight COVID-19 negative tests but were 
exposed to rescue workers, security and government officials, and 
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volunteers who rushed to the scene at the crash site. Given the COVID-19 
status of the formal and informal responders were unknown and the 
airport was located in a high transmission area designated as ‘hotspot’, 
all rescued passengers and responders were quarantined and subjected 
to COVID-19 testing. The entire District Government Office, and airport 
emergency staff were quarantined, compromising the capacity of gov-
ernment and airport function in addition to adding to the COVID-19 
response burden in the airport vicinity. 
While the full extent of accident-attributable transmission primary 
and secondary transmission of SARS-COVI-2 is still being studied, the 
incident underscores the fragilities of risk aversion during air travel with 
implications for international assistance. Both airlines and airport 
management systems should have protocols in place that anticipate and 
prepare the ground staff for emergencies during pandemics. Plans 
should assure COVID-19 free status of all airport and responder staff, 
triage plans, a maintenance pool of vetted volunteers from the com-
munity oriented to disease mitigation concepts who could improve 
emergency response capacity, and surplus personal protection equip-
ment in place. Advisories to travellers should include mention of 
emergencies including potential quarantine of survivors and such 
advance warning can help improve travellers’ coping capabilities during 
an unanticipated crisis. 
3.14. Pre- and in-flight measures by airline 
The International Air Transport Association sets forth rules for safe 
flying [93]. The implementation of said rules varies greatly based on the 
airline. While all airlines enforce masks on the flight, there are many 
differences in pre-flight and in-flight measures (Table 4). 
Information on measures taken by airlines can be very difficult to 
find. With some airlines such as Emirates or Air China, all information is 
transparently visible on their webpage making it easy for the traveller to 
comprehend what is awaiting him at the airport or during the flight. 
Others, unfortunately display the information in a very chaotic way, or 
are very vague about the measures they are taking, or do not display the 
measures at all and are also reluctant to provide concise answers when 
contacted. 
There are significant differences in pre-flight measures of airlines. 
Some, like the Lufthansa group or Emirates encourage or enforce pre- 
flight testing for their passengers. GoIndiGo on the other hand created 
an app that requires passengers to complete e questionnaires on their 
health status multiple times before the flight, which is essentially a 
telemedicine application. 
Most airlines disinfect their plane before and after every flight. Some, 
like Aeroflot or the Emirates also disinfect sanitary facilities inflight 
during long flights. Air China varies the frequency based on an internal 
risk evaluation. Others, like Easyjet or Ryanair only seem to disinfect 
their flights once a day, claiming that this suffices for a full 24 h. 
A vast majority of airlines have reduced the food they are serving to 
prepackaged food or own food only. Turkish Airlines has a shift-based 
eating system only allowing certain groups of passengers to eat at 
once. All airlines seem to allow drinking during the flight, and all air-
lines enforce wearing a mask, or in the case of Aeroflot also gloves 
inflight. 
All airlines we looked at are using HEPA filters. Some, like Turkish 
Airlines have especially designated isolation seats in case someone be-
comes symptomatic inflight. 
There was little information available on which airlines use pas-
senger locater forms, with some airlines such as Lufthansa stating openly 
that it is a data protection issue, and others such as Goindigo making it 
mandartory via their app. 
A report [98] report published by Faculty and Scientists at the 
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health provides a comprehensive 
and thorough summary on common practices and recommendations 
concerning SARS-CoV-2 transmission during travel. They propose a 
layered approach for reduction of SARS-CoV-2 transmission (Education 
and Awareness; Screening; Physical and Engineering Controls; Process 
Management, and PPE) by means of NPIs (Non-Pharmaceutical In-
terventions) and suggests a reduction of risk to minimal levels can be 
achieved by utilizing standard control measures (social distancing, 
wearing masks, disinfecting of surfaces, screenings, testing and a strict 
enforcement of those measures) that are effective in other circum-
stances. Such an approach can mitigate the transmission risk of 
SARS-CoV-2 to passengers and crew members. We summarized those 
findings along with our recommendations in Fig. 2. 
4. Limitations 
Our paper is a rapid, narrative review of the status quo (as of October 
2020) of air-travel in the pandemic and peri-pandemic period. It is 
limited because it is not a systematic review and also because of the 
rapidly evolving numbers of publications that may have an impact on 
precautions related to air travel and SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
5. Conclusions 
In the pandemic and peri-pandemic periods, a substantial reduction 
in air travel numbers is apparent with a decrease (−51.6%) in passenger 
departures. Trends show that the most resilient and fastest travel flows 
for recovery are domestic flights and neighboring country travel, last 
minute travel, visiting friends and relatives and essential business travel. 
Systematic reviews show that in general, travel restrictions have only 
limited effect in containing infection, and the degree of impact depends 
on multiple factors ranging from the extent and timing of the re-
strictions, the epidemic size, to virus transmissibility and travel patterns. 
Quarantine of travellers from a country with a declared outbreak may 
delay introduction or re-introduction of the virus, or may delay the peak 
of transmission, or both, but the effect is small and there are limitations 
to the evidence available. 
Temperature screening is ineffective. A combined approach of tele-
medicine (i.e. patients have to fill out self-assessment form prior to 
flight) and facilities at airports performing both systematic rapid tests, 
possibly a combination of saliva and antigen could be a viable future 
strategy at airports. Going forward, on arrival based saliva testing might 
thus be the best way to reduce the number of persons who have to 
quarantine after arrival. Hand hygiene and physical distancing from the 
point of entering an airport until leaving an airport as well as continuous 
face coverings are key elements of preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
Despite high air turnaround and high efficiency filtering used in air-
crafts, there is some evidence that passengers within two rows of an 
index case are at higher risk. A retrospective analysis shows, however, 
that when stringent hygiene measures are enforced inflight, trans-
mission rates of SARS-CoV-2 are likely to be very low, as little as one 
case per 27 million travellers, even with positive cases aboard. Guide-
lines from airlines are difficult to research. Most airlines disinfect their 
flights and enforce wearing masks and social distancing to a certain 
degree. Information on other precautions are lacking, not transparent 
and confusing to interpret. A layered approach of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (including masks and sanitisers) for the entire journey (, 
home to airport to final destination) is indicated. While the guidelines 
set out by IATA are straight forward, a common platform for contact 
tracing, telemedicine approaches by preflight questionnaires and 
COVID-19 test results is lacking. What is necessary is a unified front with 
all stakeholders, further validation of existing rapid tests and an expert 
committee to systematically evaluate preventive strategies so that rec-
ommendations for safe air-travel are evidence based. 
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Preflight-Measures of the 20 biggest airlines by size as of October 15th.   












Rapid tests before 
boarding 
Swiss Airlines x (x) ? ? ? x ? ? – 
Emirates x – x x ? X ? x x 
Turkish Airlines x – x – (−) (+) (just 
temperature) 
x ? ? – 
Air Canada x – x – ? x x x – 
Lufthansa x (x) x – – - (plexiglass) x x x 
American Airlines x – ? - – – x x – – 
British airways x – – – – ? x x – 
ANA x – x x – x x x – 
Air France x (x) possibility x – – x x x – 
Southwest Airlines x – x (x) wipes – x x x – 
Alaska Airlines x (x) possibility – – – x x x – 
Ryanair x – self – – (x) limited (x) encouraged ? – 
Easyjet x – (x) varies – – x x x – 
Aeroflot x + gloves + change mask 
every 3 h 
– x 37◦ x ? x x x – 
United x – x – – x x x – 
Delta Airlines x – x x ? x x x – 
China Southern 
Airlines 
x – x (also during flight) x x x x x – 
China Eastern 
Airlines 
x – x x ? ? ? ? – 
Air China x – x x ? x x x – 
IndiGo x – x + health declaration 
app 
x x x x x – 
LATAM Airlines x – – – ? x x x – 
Avianca x – x – – x x x –  




enforced (empty seats) 














Swiss Airlines x x – x x x – x ? ? – 
Emirates x x – (x) (x) x x x ? ? – 
Turkish 
Airlines 
x x – (x) - not at same 
time 
x x ? x x x (waiting 
period) 
x 
Air Canada x x – (x) prepacked (x) limited x x x ? ? ? 
Lufthansa x x – x x x – x – – – 
American 
Airlines 
(x) – – x x x – x – – – 
British Airways x – – x x x – x – x – 
ANA x x – (x) limited x x – x ? ? – 
Air France x x x (x) limited (x) x – x ? ? – 
Southwest x x x (x) limited x x – x – x – 
Alaska x x x (x) limited x x x x (+ATP testing +
cleaning certificates) 
? x x 
Ryanair x ? – (x) limited x x – - (once daily) ? - ? – 
Easyjet x x – (x) limited x x – - (once daily) x x – 
Aeroflot x +
gloves 
x – (x) limited x x + air 
renewal 
x x x x – 
United x x – (x) limited x x – x – x – 
Delta x x x - (own food ok) – x x x ? - x – 
China Southern 
Airlines 
x x – (x) prepackaged x x x x ? x x 
China Eastern 
Airlines 
x ? – (x) limited ? x x x ? ? – 
Air China x x ? (x) limited x x x (different risk levels, 
up to hourly) 
x ? ? ? 
IndiGo x x – x x x – x x x – 
LATAM 
Airlines 
x x – x x x – – – x – 
Avianca x x – x prepackaged x x ? – – – –  
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Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions to Reduce Risk 
Phase One Report: Gate-to-Gate Travel Onboard 
Aircraft Prepared by Faculty and Scientists at the 
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health).   
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